dc.identifier.uri |
http://dx.doi.org/10.15488/17251 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
https://www.repo.uni-hannover.de/handle/123456789/17379 |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Hilligardt, Hannah
|
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2024-04-30T06:27:00Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2024-04-30T06:27:00Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2023 |
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dc.identifier.citation |
Hilligardt, H.: Partisan science and the democratic legitimacy ideal. In: Synthese: An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science 202 (2023), Nr. 5, 135. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04370-5 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
The democratic legitimacy ideal requires value judgments in science to be legitimised by democratic procedures in order for them to reflect the public interest or democratic aims. Such a view has been explicitly defended by Intemann (2015) and Schroeder (2021), amongst others, and reflects a more widely shared commitment to a democratisation of science and integration of public participation procedures. This paper suggests that the democratic legitimacy ideal in its current form does not leave space for partisan science – science that is politically or societally engaged. This is problematic because partisan research can contribute substantially to science and society, a point that I will illustrate with a recent case study from the Netherlands. To resolve this problem, I scrutinise the notion of democratic legitimacy and consider its use in the values in science discourse. Current discussions focus on democratic decision-making procedures to legitimise specific value judgements. I show that this focus does not adequately represent sound procedures of legitimisation at the hand of political theories of representation. Consequently, I develop a different approach: I propose to consider scientists as a special case of representatives who are authorised to make independent value judgements while nevertheless being constrained by the demands of their constituencies. Based on this approach, I argue that values in science do not need to be based on democratically agreed upon aims or the public interest in every instance. Instead, I advocate for a pluralist system of scientific mandates, which differs from both value pluralism and the democratic legitimacy ideal. |
eng |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
|
dc.publisher |
Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V |
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dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Synthese: An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science 202 (2023), Nr. 5 |
|
dc.rights |
CC BY 4.0 Unported |
|
dc.rights.uri |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
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dc.subject |
Activist science |
eng |
dc.subject |
Democratic aims approach |
eng |
dc.subject |
Democratic legitimacy |
eng |
dc.subject |
Impartiality |
eng |
dc.subject |
Values in science |
eng |
dc.subject.ddc |
100 | Philosophie
|
|
dc.title |
Partisan science and the democratic legitimacy ideal |
eng |
dc.type |
Article |
|
dc.type |
Text |
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dc.relation.essn |
1573-0964 |
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dc.relation.doi |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04370-5 |
|
dc.bibliographicCitation.issue |
5 |
|
dc.bibliographicCitation.volume |
202 |
|
dc.bibliographicCitation.firstPage |
135 |
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dc.description.version |
publishedVersion |
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tib.accessRights |
frei zug�nglich |
|